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Abstract
In this chapter we study some aspects of the problem of stable
marriage. There are two distinguished marriage plans: the fully trans-
ferable case, where money can be transferred between the participants,
and the fully non transferable case where each participant has its own
rigid preference list regarding the other gender. We continue to discuss
intermediate partial transferable cases. Partial transferable plans can
be approached as either special cases of cooperative games using the
notion of a core, or as a generalization of the cyclical monotonicity
property of the fully transferable case (fake promises). We shall intro-
duced these two approaches, and prove the existence of stable marriage
for the fully transferable and non-transferable plans.
Keywords: Cyclic monotonicity, core, cooperative games, Monge-Kantorovich
1 Introduction
Consider two sets Im, Iw of N elements each. We may think about Im
as a set of men and Iw as a set of women. We denote a man in Im by
i and a woman in Iw by i′ .
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A marriage plan (MP) is a bijection which assign to each man in
Im a unique woman in Iw (and v.v). A matching of a man i ∈ Im
to a woman j
′ ∈ Iw is denoted by ij′ . The set of all such matchings
is isomorphic to the set of permutations on {1, . . . N}. Evidently, we
can arrange the order according to a given marriage plan and represent
this plan as {ii′}; i = 1 . . . N .
The MP {ii′} is called stable if and only if there are no blocking
pairs. A blocking pair is composed of a man i and a woman j
′ 6= i′
such that both i prefers j
′
over his assigned woman i
′
and j
′
prefers i
over her assigned man j.
In order to complete this definition we have to establish a criterion
of preferences over the possible matchings in Im × Iw.
Let us consider two extreme cases. The first is the fully transferable
(FT) case [18, 19, 2, 3]. Here we assume a utility value θij′ for a
potential matching ij
′
. If ij
′
are matched, they can split this reward
θij′ between themselves as they wish.
The second case is fully non-transferable (FNT) [7, 14, 8]. This in-
volves no utility value (and no money reward). Each participant (man
or woman) list the set of participants of the other gender according to
a preference list: For each man i ∈ Im there exist an order relation i
on Im, such that j′ i k′ means that the man i will prefer the woman
j
′
over the woman k
′
. Likewise, each woman i
′ ∈ Iw have its own
order relation i′ over Im.
These two notions seems very different, and indeed they are, not
only because the first one seems to defines the preference in materialis-
tic terms and the second hints on ”true love”. In fact, we can quantify
the non-transferable case as well: There may be a reward θm
ij′ for a man
i marrying a woman j′, such that j
′ i k′ iff θmij′ > θmik′ . Likewise,
θw
ij′ quantifies the reward the the woman j
′
obtains while marrying the
man i.
Given a matching {ii′}, a blocking pair in the FNT case is a pair
ij
′
, j
′ 6= i′ such that the man i prefers the woman j′ over his matched
woman i
′
(i.e j
′ i i′ , or θmij′ > θmii′ ) and the woman j
′
prefers i over
her matched man j (j i′ i, or θwij′ > θwjj′ ). Thus, a blocking pair ij
′
is defined by
min{θm
ij′ − θmii′ , θwij′ − θwjj′} > 0 . (1)
Definition 1.1. The matching {ii;} is stable if and only if
min{θm
ij′ − θmii′ , θwij′ − θwjj′} ≤ 0
for any i, j ∈ Im and i′ , j′ ∈ Iw.
Let
θij′ := θ
m
ij′ + θ
w
ij′ . (2)
Definition 1.1 implies that the condition
θii′ + θjj′ ≥ θij′ + θji′ (3)
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is necessary for all i, j for the stability of {ii′} in the FNT case.
Let us consider now the fully transferable (FT) case. Here a married
pair ii
′
can share the rewards θii′ for their marriage. Suppose the man
i cuts ui and the woman i
′
cuts vi′ form their mutual reward θii′ .
Evidently, ui + vi′ = θii′ . If
ui + vj′ < θij′ (4)
for some j
′ 6= i′ then ij′ is a blocking pair, since both i and j′ can
increase their cuts to match the mutual reward θij′ . Hence
θij′ + θji′ > ui + vj′ + uj + vi′ = θii′ + θjj′
so (3) is a necessary condition for the stability in the FT case as well.
Evidently, condition (3) is not a sufficient one, unless N = 2 in the
FT case.
A simple example (N = 2):
θm w1 w2
m1 1 0
m2 0 1
;
θw w1 w2
m1 1 5
m2 0 1
The matching {11′ , 22′} is FNT stable. Indeed θm
11′ = 1 >
θm
12′ = 0 while θ
m
22′ = 1 > θ
m
21′ = 0, so both men are happy,
and this is enough for FNT stability, since that neither {12′}
nor {21′} is a blocking pair. On the other hand, if the married
pairs share their rewards θij′ = θ
m
ij′ + θ
w
ij′ we get
θ w1 w2
m1 2 5
m2 0 2
so
θ11′ + θ22′ = 4 < 5 = θ12′ + θ21′ ,
thus {21′ , 12′} is the stable marriage in the FT case.
However, we may extend the necessary condition (3) in the FT case
as follows:
Consider the couples i1i
′
1, . . . iki
′
k, k ≥ 2 . The sum of the rewards
for these couples is
∑k
l=1 θili′l
. Suppose they perform a ”chain deal”
such that man il marries woman i
′
l+1 for 1 ≤ l ≤ k−1, and the last man
ik marries the first woman i
′
1. The net reward for the new matching is∑k−1
l=1 θili′l+1
+ θiki′1
.
This leads to a definition of a blocking chain:
Definition 1.2. A chain i1i
′
1, . . . iki
′
k of married couples forms a block-
ing chain iff
k∑
l=1
(θili′l+1
− θili′l ) > 0 (5)
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where i
′
k+1 := i
′
1. If there are no blocking chains then the matching
{ii′} is called cyclically monotone [16].
The notion of a blocking chain extends the condition (4) from k = 2
to k ≥ 2. It turns that it is also necessary condition for the stability
in the fully transferable case:
Proposition 1.1. If a marriage {ii′} is a stable one for the FT case
then it is cyclically monotone.
Proof. Let {ii′} be a matching, such that ui is the cut of man i marry-
ing i
′
and vi′ the cut of the woman i
′
marrying i. Suppose by negation
that i1i
′
1 . . . iki
′
k is a blocking chain. Since ui + vi′ ≤ θii′ we obtain
k∑
l=1
θili′l+1
>
k∑
l=1
θili′l
≥
k∑
l=1
(uil + vi′l
) =
k∑
l=1
(uil + vi′l+1
)
so, in particular, there exists a pair ili
′
l+1 for which θili′l+1
> uil +vi′l+1
.
Hence ili
′
l+1 is a blocking pair via (4).
We shall see later on that cyclical monotonicity is, actually, an
equivalent definition to stability in the FT case.
The notion of cyclical monotonicity implies an additional level of
cooperation for the marriage game. Not only the married pair share
their utility between themselves via (2), but also different couples are
ready to share their reward via a chain deal according to Definition
1.2. If the total reward after the chain exchange exceeds their reward
prior to this deal, the lucky ones are ready to share their reward with
the unlucky and compensate their loss
What about the FNT case? Of course there is no point talking
about a ”chain deal” in that case. However, we may define a ”FNT
blocking chain” i1i
′
1 . . . iki
′
k by
max
1≤l≤k
min{θm
ili
′
l+1
− θm
ili
′
l
, θw
ili
′
l+1
− θw
ili
′
l
} > 0 (6)
where, again, i
′
k+1 ≡ i
′
1. Definition 1.1 is analogs to the statement that
that there are no blocking chains of this form. Thus, a marriage {ii′}
is stable in the FNT case if and only if
max
1≤l≤k
min{θm
ili
′
l+1
− θm
ili
′
l
, θw
ili
′
l+1
− θw
ili
′
l
} ≤ 0 (7)
for any chain deal i1i
′
1 . . . iki
′
k.
At the first sight definition (7) seems redundant, since it provides
no further information. However, we can observe the analogy between
(5) and (7). In fact, (7) and (5) are obtained from each other by the
exchanges
θili′l+1
−θili′l ⇐⇒ min{θ
m
ili
′
l+1
−θm
ili
′
l
, θw
ili
′
l+1
−θw
ili
′
l
} and
k∑
1
⇐⇒ max
1≤i≤k
(8)
In section 2.2 below we will take advantage on this representation.
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2 Partial sharing
Here we present two possible definitions of intermediate marriage game
which interpolate between the fully transferable and the non transfer-
able case. The first is based on the notion of core of a cooperative
game, and the second is based on cyclic monotonicity.
2.1 Stable marriage as a cooperative game
This part follows some of the ideas in Galichon et.all and references
therein1 [10]. See also [6].
Assume that we can guarantee a cut ui for each married man i,
and a cut vj′ for each married woman j
′
. In order to define a stable
marriage we have to impose some conditions which will guarantee that
no man or woman can increase his or her cut by marrying a different
partner. For this let us define, for each pair ij
′
, a pairwise bargaining
set F(ij′) ⊂ R2 which contains all possible cuts (ui, vj′ ) for a matching
of man i with woman j
′
.
Assumption 2.1. .
i) For each i ∈ Im and j′ ∈ Iw, F(ij′) are closed sets in R2, equal to
the closure of their interior. Let F0(ij′) the interior of F(ij′).
ii) F(ij′) is monotone in the following sense: If (u, v) ∈ F(ij′) then
(u
′
, v
′
) ∈ F(ij′) whenever u′ ≤ u and v′ ≤ v.
iii) There exist C1, C2 ∈ R such that
{(u, v); max(u, v) ≤ C2} ⊂ F(ij′) ⊂ {(u, v);u+ v ≤ C1}
for any i ∈ Im, j ∈ Iw.
The meaning of the feasibility set is as follows:
Any married couple ij
′ ∈ Im × Iw can guarantee the cut u for
i and v for j
′
, provided (u, v) ∈ F(ij′).
Definition 2.1. . The feasibility set V (F) ⊂ R2N is composed of all
vectors (u1, . . . uN , v1, . . . vN ) which satisfies
(ui, vj′ ) ∈ R2 −F0(ij
′
)
for any ij
′ ∈ Im × Iw.
The marriage plan {ii′} is stable if and only if there exists (u1, . . . vN ) ∈
V (F) such that (ui, vi′ ) ∈ F(ii
′
) for any i ∈ {1, . . . N}.
The FNT case is contained in definition 2.1, where
F(ij′) := {u ≤ θm
ij′ ; v ≤ θwij′} . (9)
1which was turned to my attention by R. McCann
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Figure 1: pairwise bargaining sets
Indeed, if {ii′} is a stable marriage plan let ui = θmii′ and vi′ = θwii′ .
Then (u1, . . . vN ) satisfies (ui, vi′ ) ∈ F for any i ∈ {1 . . . N}. Since
there are no blocking pairs if follows that for any j
′ 6= i′ , either
θm
ij′ > θii′ = ui or θ
w
ij′ > θ
w
jj′ = vj′ , hence (ui, vj′ ) ∈ R2 − F0(ij
′
)
so (u1 . . . vN ) ∈ V (F) (Fig. [1a]).
The FT case (Fig. [1b]) is obtained by
F(ij′) := {(u, v); u+ v ≤ θij′} . (10)
Indeed, if {ii′} is a stable marriage plan and (u1, . . . vN ) are the corre-
sponding cuts satisfying ui+vj′ = θij′ , then for each j
′ 6= i′ we obtain
ui + vj′ ≥ θij′ (otherwise ij
′
is a blocking pair). This implies that
(ui, vj′ ) ∈ R2 −F0(ij
′
).
There are other, sensible models of partial transfers which fit into
the formalism of Definition 2.1 and Theorem 3.1. Let us consider
several examples:
1. Transferable marriages restricted to non-negative cuts : In the
transferable case the feasibility sets may contain negative cuts
for the man u or for the woman v (even though not for both, if
it is assumed θij′ > 0). To avoid the undesired stable marriages
were one of the partners get a negative cut we may replace the
feasibility set (10) by
F(ij′) := {(u, v) ∈ R2;u+ v ≤ θij′ ,max(u, v) ≤ θij′} ,
see Fig. [1c]. It can be easily verified that if (u1, . . . vN ) ∈ V (F)
contains negative components, then ([u1]+, . . . [vN ]+), obtained
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by replacing the negative components by 0, is in V (F) as well.
Thus, the core of this game contains vectors in V (F) of non-
negative elements.
2. In the transferable case (10) we allowed both men and women
to transfer money to their partner. Indeed, we assumed that the
man’s i cut is θm
ij′ − w and the woman’s j cut is θwij′ + w, where
w ∈ R. Suppose we wish to allow only transfer between men to
women, so we insists on w ≥ 0. In that case we choose (Fig. [1d])
F(ij′) := {(u, v) ∈ R2; u+ v ≤ θij′ ; u ≤ θmij′} . (11)
3. Let us assume that the transfer w from man i to woman j
′
is
taxed, and the tax depends on i, j
′
. Thus, if man i transfers
w > 0 to a woman j
′
he reduces his cut by w, but the woman cut
is increased by an amount βi,jw, were βi,j ∈ [0, 1]. Here 1− βi,j
is the tax implied for this transfer. It follows that
ui ≤ θmij′ − w ; vj′ ≤ θwij′ + βi,jw , w ≥ 0
Hence
F(ij′) := {(u, v) ∈ R2; ui + β−1i,j vj′ ≤ θβij′ , ui ≤ θmij′} ,
where θβ
ij′
:= θm
ij′ + β
−1
i,j θ
w
ij′ . The geometrical description of F us
as in Fig. [1d], where the dashed line is tilted.
2.2 Stability by fake promises
Suppose a man can make a promise to a married woman (which is not
his wife), and v.v. The principle behind it is that each of them does
not intend to honor his/her own promise, but, nevertheless, believes
that the other parti will honor hers/his. It is also based on both partial
sharing inside a married pair, as well as some collaboration between
the pairs.
Define
∆(q)(i, j
′
) := min
{
q(θm
ij′ − θmii′ ) + θwij′ − θwjj′
q(θw
ij′ − θwjj′ + θmij′ − θmii′
}
, (12)
where 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. In particular
∆(0)(i, j
′
) := min{θm
ij′ − θmii′ , θwij′ − θwj′ j′}
∆(1)(i, j
′
) := θm
ij′ − θmii′ + θwij′ − θwii′ ≡ θij′ − θii′ .
The value of q represents the level of internal sharing inside the couple.
Thus, q = 0 means there is no sharing whatsoever, and the condition
∆(0)(i, j
′
) > 0 for a blocking pairs implies that both i and j
′
gains
from the exchange, is displayed in (6) .
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On the other hand, ∆(1)(i, j
′
) + ∆(1)(j, i
′
) > 0, namely
θii′ + θjj′ < θij′ + θji′
is, as we argued, a necessary condition for a blocking pair in FT case,
where θ represents the sum of the rewards to of the pair via (2).
We now consider an additional parameter p ∈ [0, 1] and define the
real valued function on R:
x 7→ [x]p := [x]+ − p[x]− (13)
Note that [x]p = x for any p if x ≥ 0, while [x]1 = x for any real x.
The parameter p represents the level of sharing between the pairs.
Definition 2.2. Let 0 ≤ p, q ≤ 1. The matching {ii′} is (p, q)−stable
if for any k ∈ N and i1, i2, . . . ik ∈ {1, . . . N}
k∑
l=1
[
∆(q)(il, i
′
l+1)
]
p
≤ 0 where ik+1 = i1
where ik+1 := i1.
Note that p = 0 implies that ∆(q)(i, j
′
) ≤ 0 for any j′ 6= i′ . If,
in addition, q = 0 then this is just the statement that there are no
blocking pairs in the FNT case.
On the other hand, p = 1 implies
k∑
l=1
∆(q)(il, i
′
l+1) ≤ 0 where
which is reduced to (5) if q = 1 as well.
Let us interpret the meaning of q, p in the context of utility ex-
change. A man i ∈ Im can offer some bribe w to any other women
j
′
he might be interested in (except his own wife, so j
′ 6= i′). His cut
for marrying j
′
is now θm
ij′ − w. The cut of the woman j
′
should have
been θw
ij′ + w. However, the happy woman have to pay some tax for
accepting this bribe. Let q ∈ [0, 1] be the fraction of the bribe she
can get (after paying her tax). Her supposed cut for marrying i is just
θw
ij′ + qw. Woman j
′
will believe and accept offer from man i if two
conditions are satisfied: the offer should be both
1. Competitive, namely θw
ij′ + qw ≥ θwj′ j′ .
2. Trusted, if woman j
′
believes that man i is motivated. This
implies θm
ij′ − w ≥ θmii′ .
The two conditions above can be satisfied, and the offer is acceptable,
only if
q(θm
ij′ − θmii′ ) + θwij′ − θwjj′ > 0 . (14)
Symmetrically, man i will accept an offer from a woman j
′ 6= i′ only if
q(θw
ij′ − θwii′ ) + θmij′ − θmjj′ > 0 . (15)
8
The utility of the exchange ii
′
to ij
′
is, then defined by the minimum
∆(q)(i, j
′
) of (14, 15) via (12).
To understand the role of p, consider the chain of pairs exchanges
(i1i
′
1 → i1i
′
2), . . . (ik−1i
′
k−1 → ik−1i
′
k), (iki
′
k)→ (iki
′
1) .
Each of the pair exchange (il, il)→ (il, il+1) yields a utility
∆(q)(il, i
′
l+1) for the new pair. The lucky new pairs in this chain of
couples exchange are those who makes a positive reward. The unfortu-
nate new pairs are those who suffer a loss (negative reward). The lucky
pairs, whose interest is to activate this chain, are ready to compensate
the unfortunate ones by contributing some of their gained utility. The
chain will be activated (and the original marriages will break down)
if the mutual contribution of the fortunate pairs is enough to cover
at least the p− part of the mutually loss of utility of the unfortunate
pairs. This is the condition
∑
∆(q)(il,i
′
l+1)>0
∆(q)(il, i
′
l+1)+p
∑
∆(q)(il,i
′
l+1)<0
∆(q)(il, i
′
l+1) ≡
k∑
l=1
[
∆(q)(il, i
′
l+1)
]
p
> 0 .
 Stability by Definition 2.2 grantees that no such chain is activated.
3 Existence of stable marriage plans
In the general case of Assumption 2.1, the existence of a stable match-
ing follows from the following Theorem:
Theorem 3.1. Let W (F) ⊂ R2N defined as follows:
(u1, . . . uN , v1, . . . vN ) ∈W (F) ,
⇔ ∃ an injection τ : Im → Iw such that (ui, vi′ ) ∈ F(ii
′
) where
i
′
= τ(i) , ∀ i ∈ Im . Then there exists (u1, . . . uN , v1, . . . vN ) ∈W (F)
such that
(ui, vj′ ) ∈ R2 −F0(ij
′
) (16)
for any (i, j
′
) ∈ Im × Iw.
The set of vectors in W (F) satisfying (16) is called the core. Note
that the core is identified with the set of R2N vector in V (F) which
satisfy the condition (ui, vi′ ) ∈ F(ii
′
). Hence Definition 2.1 can be
recognized as the non-emptiness of the core, which is equivalent to the
existence of a stable matching.
Theorem 3.1 is, in fact, a special case the celebrated Theorem of
Scarf [17] for cooperative games, tailored to the marriage scenario (see
also [12, 4]). As we saw, it can be applied to the fully non-transferable
case (9), as well as to the fully transferable case (10).
Theorem 3.1 implies, in particular, the existence of stable marriage
in the FNT case corresponding to p = q = 0 or (9), as well as for the
FT case corresponding to p = q = 1 or (10).
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3.1 Gale-Shapley algorithm in the non-transferable
case
Here we describe the celebrated, constructive algorithm due to Gale
and Shapley [7], is describe below:
1. At the first stage, each man i ∈ Im proposes to the woman j ∈ Iw
at the top of his list. At the end of this stage, some women got
proposals (possibly more than one), other women may not get
any proposal.
2. At the second stage, each woman who got more than one pro-
posal, bind the man whose proposal is most preferable according
to her list (who is now engaged). She releases all the other men
who proposed. At the end of this stage, the men’s set Im is
composed of two parts: engaged and released.
3. At the next stage each released man makes a proposal to the next
woman in his preference list (whenever she is engaged or not).
4. Back to stage 2.
It is easy to verify that this process must end at a finite number of
steps. At the end of this process all women and men are engaged.
This is a stable matching!
Of course, we could reverse the role of men and women in this
algorithm. In both cases we get a stable matching. The algorithm we
indicated is the one which is best from the men’s point of view. In the
case where the women propose, the result is best for the women. In
fact
Theorem 3.2. [11] For any NT stable matching {ii′}, the rank of the
woman i
′
according to man i is at most the rank of the woman matched
to i by the above, men proposing algorithm.
3.2 Variational formulation in the fully transfer-
able case
There are several equivalent definitions of stable marriage plan in the
FT case. Here we introduces two of these.
Recall that if F is given by (11) the feasibility set V (F) (Definition
2.1) takes the form
V (F) := {(u1, . . . vN ) ∈ R2N ; ui + vj′ ≥ θij′ ∀ij
′ ∈ Im×Iw}. (17)
Recall also Definition 1.2 for cyclical monotonicity.
Theorem 3.3. {ii′} is a stable marriage plan in the FT case if and
only if one of the following equivalent conditions is satisfied:
• Efficiency (or maximal public utility): ∑Ni=1 θii′ ≥ ∑Ni=1 θiσ(i)
for any marriage plans σ : Im → Iw.
• {ii′} is cyclically monotone.
• Optimality: The minimal sum ∑N1 u0i+v0i of cuts in the feasibility
set (17) satisfies u0i + v
0
i′ = θii′ (i.e {u01, . . . v0N} is in the core).
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The efficiency characterization of stable marriage connects this no-
tion with optimal transport and the celebrated Monge Kantorovich
theory [15, 13, 20]. See also [9].
Since the set of all bijections is finite and the maximum on a finite
set is always achieved we obtain from the efficiency characterization.
Corollary 3.1. There always exists a stable marriage plan in the FT
case.
Remark 3.1. As far as we know, the fully transferable case (17) is
the only case whose stable marriages are obtained by a variational ar-
gument.
Proof. (of theorems 3.3) In Proposition 1.1 we obtained that FT sta-
bility implies cyclical monotonicity. We now prove that cyclical mono-
tonicity implies efficiency. The proof follows the idea published orig-
inally by Afriat in 1963 [1], and was introduced recently in a much
simpler form by Bresis [5].
Let
− u0i := inf
k−chains,k∈N
(
k−1∑
l=1
θili′l
− θili′l+1
)
+ θiki′k
− θiki′ . (18)
Let α > −u0i and consider a k−chain realizing
α >
(
k−1∑
l=1
θili′l
− θili′l+1
)
+ θiki′k
− θiki′ (19)
By cyclic monotonicity,
∑k
l=1 θili′l
− θili′l+1 ≥ 0. Since i
′
k+1 = i
′
1,
k−1∑
l=1
θili′l
− θili′l+1 ≥ θiki′1 − θiki′k
so (19) implies
α > θik,i′1
− θik,i′ ≥ 0 ,
in particular u0i <∞.
Hence, for any j ∈ Im
α+ θii′ − θij′ >
(
k−1∑
l=1
θil,i′l
− θil,i′l+1
)
+ θiki′k
− θiki′ + θii′ − θij′ ≥ −u0j (20)
where the last inequality follows by the substitution of the k+1−cycle
i1 = i, i2, . . . , ik, ik+1 = i in (18). Since α is any number bigger than
−u0i it follows
− u0i + θii′ − θij′ ≥ −u0j , (21)
for any pair i, j ∈ Im. Now, let σ be any permutation in Im and let
j = σ(i). Then
− u0i + θii′ − θiσ(i′ ) ≥ −u0σ(i) . (22)
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Since σ is a bijection on Im as well, so ΣNi=1u0i =
∑N
i=1 u
0
σ(i). Then,
sum (22) over 1 ≤ i ≤ N to obtain
N∑
i=1
θii′ ≥
N∑
i=1
θiσ(i′ ) ,
so {ii′} is an efficient marriage plan.
To prove that any efficient solution is stable, we define v0j := θjj′ −
u0j so
u0j + v
0
j′ = θjj′ . (23)
Then (21) implies
u0i + v
0
j′ = u
0
i + θjj′ − u0j ≥ u0i − u0i + θij′ = θij′ (24)
for any i, j. Thus, (23,24) establish that {ii′} is a stable marriage via
Definition 2.1.
Finally, the optimality condition follows immedietly from the defi-
nition of the feasibility set
N∑
1
ui + vi′ =
N∑
1
ui + vσ(i) ≥
N∑
1
θiσ(i)
for any bijection σ : Im → Iw and from (23).
3.3 On existence and non-existence of stable fake
promises
Theorem 3.4. If the matching {ii′} is (p, q)−stable, then it is also
(p
′
, q
′
)−stable for p′ ≥ p and q′ ≤ q.
The proof of this Theorem follows from the definitions (12, 13) and
the following
Lemma 3.1. For any , i 6= j and 1 ≥ q > q′ ≥ 0,
(1 + q)−1∆(q)(i, j) > (1 + q
′
)−1∆(q
′
)(i, j).
Proof. For a, b ∈ R and r ∈ [0, 1] define
∆r(a, b) :=
1
2
(a+ b)− r
2
|a− b| .
Observe that ∆1(a, b) ≡ min(a, b). In addition, r 7→ ∆r(a, b) is mono-
tone not increasing in r. A straightforward calculation yields
min(qa+ b, qb+ a) = ∆1(qa+ b, qb+ a) = (q + 1)∆ 1−q
1+q
(a, b) ,
and the Lemma follows from the above observation, upon inserting
a = θm(i, j)− θm(i, i) and b = θw(i, j)− θw(j, j).
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P=1
q=1
?
Non-existence
Figure 2: Conjecture: Is there an unconditional existence of stable marriages
in the gray area?
What can be said about the existence of s (p, q)− stable matching
in the general case? Unfortunately, we can prove now only a negative
result:
Proposition 3.1. For any 1 ≥ q > p ≥ 0, a stable marriage does not
exist unconditionally.
Proof. We only need to present a counter-example. So, let N = 2. To
show that the matching 11
′
, 22
′
is not stable we have to show[
∆(q)(1, 2
′
)
]
p
+
[
∆(q)(2, 1
′
)
]
p
> 0 (25)
while, to show that 12
′
, 21
′
is not stable we have to show[
∆(q)(1, 1
′
)
]
p
+
[
∆(q)(2, 2
′
)
]
p
> 0 . (26)
By definition (12) and Lemma 3.1
∆(q)(1, 2
′
) = (q + 1)∆r
(
θm
12′ − θm11′ , θw12′ − θw22′
)
∆(q)(2, 1
′
) = (q + 1)∆r
(
θm
21′ − θm22′ , θw21′ − θw11′
)
where r = 1−q1+q . To obtain ∆
(q)(1, 1
′
),∆(q)(2, 2
′
) we just have to ex-
change man 1 with man 2, so
∆(q)(2, 2
′
) = (q + 1)∆r
(
θm
22′ − θm21′ , θw22′ − θw12′
)
∆(q)(1, 1
′
) = (q + 1)∆r
(
θm
11′ − θm12′ , θw11′ − θw21′
)
.
All in all, we only have 4 parameters to play with:
a1 := θ
m
12′ − θm11′ , a2 = θw12′ − θw22′ ,
b1 = θ
m
21′ − θm22′ , b2 = θw21′ − θw11′ ,
so the two conditions to be verified are
[∆r(a1, a2)]p+[∆r(b1, b2)]p > 0 ; [∆r(−a1,−b2)]p+[∆r(−b1,−a2)]p > 0 .
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Let us insert a1 = a2 := a > 0. b1 = b2 := −b where b > 0. So
[∆r(a1, a1)]p = a, [∆r(b1, b2)]p = −pb ,
while ∆r(−a1,−b2) = ∆r(−b1,−a2) = b−a2 − r2 (a + b). In particular,
the condition ab <
1−r
1+r implies [∆r(−a1,−b2)]p = [∆r(−b1,−a2)]p > 0
which verifies (26). On the other hand, if a − pb > 0 then (25) is
verified. Both conditions can be verified if 1−r1+r > p. Recalling q =
1−r
1+r
we obtain the result.
Conjecture 1. If If 0 < p < q < 1 then there always exists a (p, q)
stable marriage (c.f. Fig [2]).
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